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In 1977, after the Watergate appeals had been decided, my
Watergate colleague, George Frampton, and I recounted our
experiences and perspectives on the Watergate investigation and
aftermath in a book entitled Stonewall.'
On December 8, 1998, during my testimony before the House
Judiciary Committee considering the impeachment of William
Jefferson Clinton, Representative Robert Goodlatte (R-Va.) was
kind enough to remind me of certain observations I had made some
twenty years earlier. I quote from the transcript of that proceeding:
Mr. Ben-Veniste, you actually set this story straight a long time ago,
long before you ever heard of Paula Jones or Monica Lewinsky,
long before Bill Clinton was ever on the national scene. You wrote
a book back in 1977 called "Stonewall, The Real Story of the
Watergate Prosecution" by Richard Ben-Veniste and George
Frampton, Jr. In that, in the closing, you wrote about the
Watergate proceeding:
"Did the system work? True, the nationally televised debate and
vote on articles of impeachment was a shining hour for the House
Judiciary Committee. But all in all, the total course of the
committee's investigation exposed the extreme political nature of
impeachment." This is about the Watergate proceeding.
* Richard Ben-Veniste is a partner in the Washington, D.C. office of Weil, Gotshal
& Manges LLP. From 1968 to 1973 he was an Assistant United States Attorney in the
Southern District of New York. From 1973 to 1975 he served as chief of the Watergate
Task Force of the Watergate Special Prosecutor's Office. Since leaving government he
has been involved in the defense of many high profile criminal cases and investigations,
and has served as outside counsel to various Senate committees including as Chief
Minority Counsel to the Senate Whitewater Committee in 1995-1996.
1. Richard Ben-Veniste & George Frampton, Jr., STONEWALL: THE REAL STORY
OF THE WATERGATE PROSECUTION (1977).
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"The cumbersomeness of the process, its politicization, and the
unwillingness of so many in Congress to recognize objectively the
stark facts of criminal wrongdoing that were put in front of them
make the Nixon impeachment case an unpromising precedent."
'2
Mr. Goodlatte continued:
Here is where I think you are so farsighted, more farsighted than
anybody who has been before the committee today: "Next time,
might it not be a potent defense for a President charged with
wrongdoing to argue that his conduct, however improper, fell short
of the spectacularly widespread abuses of the Nixon administration.
If Watergate or more is what it takes to galvanize the impeachment
mechanism, can we really rely on it to protect us in the future
against gross executive wrongdoing?"
'3
I thank Representative Goodlatte for an excellent jumping-off
point to begin a discussion of my perspectives on Watergate. My
concern in 1977 was with the substantial partisan resistance to
impeachment in the face of clear violations of law involving the
President's abuse of the authority of his office. I never imagined that
impeachment would be attempted under circumstances where the
allegations of presidential misconduct boiled down to lying in a civil
deposition about an illicit consensual carnal relationship.
1. The Watergate Case
Let us remember that the Watergate case, unlike the roving
congressional and independent counsel investigations virtually co-
extensive with the Clinton presidency, started with a serious crime-
the electronic bugging and burglary of the opposition political party
by individuals closely tied to the sitting President.
In the aftermath of the arrests of the burglars, who were in the
process of replacing a malfunctioning electronic device and
photographing documents, an elaborate cover-up evolved,
orchestrated by the White House Counsel, the President's Chief of
Staff, the Chief Domestic Advisor, the President's personal lawyer,
the former Attorney General, and others high up in the
Administration, in order to obstruct investigators from obtaining
evidence of the origins and sponsorship of the burglars' activities.
The cover-up enjoyed the sometimes active cooperation of the
Deputy Director of the CIA and the Acting Director of the FBI, and
had the passive acquiescence of the new Attorney General.
It should be remembered that because of the overlap of
personnel used in various other White House projects, the Watergate
2. Impeachment Inquiry: William Jefferson Clinton, President of the United States:
Hearing Before the Comm. on the Judiciary House of Representatives, 105th Cong. 252
(1998).
3. Id.
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cover-up also served to shield against discovery of the White House
link to the break-in of Daniel Ellsberg's psychiatrist's office in an
attempt to smear Ellsberg, who faced trial for revealing the Pentagon
papers; the misuse of the IRS, the FCC, and other agencies to punish
those on Nixon's enemies list; the wiretapping of journalists; the
forging of government documents; the proposed fire-bombing of the
Brookings Institution; the surreptitious surveillance of political
opponents; and the use of thugs to rough-up anti-war demonstrators.
When one adds to that the misuse of the CIA to obscure the money
trail in Watergate, the secret payments of hush money and promises
of executive clemency to insure the silence of those already caught,
the organized effort to commit perjury and destroy evidence, the
description used by John Mitchell-"the White House horrors"--
seems a particularly apt summary of how untethered from
constitutional and lawful constraint the Nixon White House had
become.
My post-Watergate concern about the process was based on the
fact that the House Impeachment Committee had irrefutable
evidence through the tape recorded advocacy of President Nixon
himself-that payment of hush money to the burglars should
continue-that even if it took a million dollars over the coming years,
he was confident he could raise the cash. In this stunning March 21,
1973 conversation, Nixon rejected John Dean's proposal that he pull
the plug on the cover-up and that the guilty parties in the obstruction
of justice step forward and accept their punishment in the hope that
such surgery would save the President himself from the lethal cancer
Dean had diagnosed. Despite this and much, much more, ten
Republican members of the committee voted against the resolution of
impeachment. In fairness, they did ultimately withdraw their support
for the President, but only when the so-called "smoking gun" tape
was produced.
II. Perspectives on Watergate
There can be no doubt that the public's regard for the presidency
eroded dramatically during the last third of the twentieth century.
The Vietnam War, the Watergate scandal, and the Iran-Contra affair
were each events of varying seismic proportion in diminishing the
credibility of the presidency at the point when President Clinton's
wantonly selfish conduct, exacerbated by his semantic hairsplitting,
provided his political enemies with the wherewithal-at long last-to
launch their quest to remove him from office.
A. Congress
As presidential authority waned in the years after Watergate,
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
Congress vastly expanded its investigative oversight over executive
branch functions. Such investigations, with their concomitant leaks
and hearings have become a regularly used weapon in Washington's
political struggles. During the Clinton presidency, congressional
committees have routinely issued extraordinarily broad subpoenas,
whose intrusiveness would have been unthinkable twenty-five years
ago. The level of partisanship observed in the impeachment of
President Clinton exceeded anything seen in recent times, and
routinely went far beyond anything experienced in Watergate. It was
left to the Senate to restore some sense of proportionality to the
Congress, through more dignified process and, of course, ultimate
vote to acquit.
B. The News Media
Media attention to the unfolding Watergate scandal was
circumspect and slow in building, with the notable exception of the
Washington Post. Media deference to the White House now seems a
relic of the distant past, as journalism's pendulum has swung far off
plumb.
The trivialization-the O.J. Simpsonizing-of the national
media, with remarkably few exceptions, has led to the lowest public
regard for journalism in recent times. As lines between news,
political analysis and entertainment have all but vanished, it can be
confidently said that while the media may be neither pro-left nor pro-
right, it has demonstrated that it is implacably and uncritically pro-
scandal. And as two Republican Speakers of the House recently
learned, once the media sharks begin their feeding frenzy, those
entering the roiling waters of conflict may find themselves on a one-
way trip to Davy Jones' locker.
C. The Independent Counsel
Archibald Cox and Leon Jaworski demonstrated that in high-
level corruption investigations, the chief currency of the prosecutor is
the credibility of the investigation. This credibility is comprised of the
gravity of the allegation under investigation and the professionalism,
objectivity, and fairness demonstrated by the prosecutor's actions.
The very raison d'etre of an independent counsel is the public's
confidence in the integrity of the investigation. While Archie Cox
was under virtually constant attack by the Nixon White House-
culminating in his abrupt removal by the President-neither he nor
our office responded outside the boundaries of our authority. There
was never a leak of damaging information, even after the trauma of
the Saturday Night Massacre and our receipt of the most explosively
damning evidence-when the President was forced to turn over the
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tape-recorded conversations subpoenaed by the grand jury.
When we transmitted evidence of obstruction of justice and
subornation of perjury to the House Judiciary Committee, it was by
way of motion to Chief Judge Sirica. The submission contained no
advocacy or interpretation, much less any recommendation. Judge
Sirica, in authorizing its submission to the Committee, found that the
transmittal rendered no judgments, and that the grand jury had taken
care to respect its own limitations and the rights of others. And that
was the extent of our contact with the impeachment. Leon Jaworski
would no sooner have injected himself into the impeachment
proceedings by expressing an opinion-much less testifying-than he
would have appeared before the Supreme Court in love beads and
bell bottoms.
In the Whitewater independent counsel investigation, the
currency of the investigation suffered a series of devaluations
resulting from the realization that there was no cognizable criminal
offense to investigate and from a series of incidents involving leaks of
sensitive information, misuse of investigative resources, harassment
of witnesses, and the perception that political considerations and
personal moral judgments had overshadowed the mandate to conduct
a fair and objective investigation into the existence of criminal
misconduct. It was hardly surprising that after the
Whitewater/Lewinsky experience, there was little support in the
nation or on either side of the aisle in Congress for reauthorization of
the independent counsel statute.
In sum, it is my view that, since Watergate, the pendulum has
swung too far off center through the trivialization of the drastic
remedy of impeachment, the over-intrusiveness of congressional
investigation of the executive for partisan political motives, the over-
dramatization by the media of the significance of political scandal,
and by the misapplication of the awesome powers of the independent
counsel through the overzealous pursuit of the targets of
investigation.
While ours is a government of laws, it must also be recognized
that the effectiveness with which our laws are enforced and the
public's confidence in the fairness of the system are dependent in no
small degree on the ability, integrity, and judgment of those
individuals entrusted with the authority to investigate and prosecute.
To return to Representative Goodlatte's unsolicited testimonial
for my musings of two decades ago, let me close with two additional
observations from the epilogue of Stonewall:
The independence of the Watergate Special Prosecution Force and
the vitality of the criminal-justice system would have been for
naught without the political accident that yoked President Nixon's
fortune in May of 1973 to a man of integrity and independence like
Cox. It was Cox's resolve to mount a truly thorough investigation
that made the system work, not the charter insisted upon by the
Senate Judiciary Committee. Had Cox been less adamant about
assembling a highly professional staff, and we less intent upon using
our power cautiously and responsibly, the effectiveness of our
investigation could have been undercut by a political backlash long
before any indictments were returned.
4
Neither Congress nor the Executive has shown much interest in
acting upon the recommendations made by the Ervin Committee,
the Special Prosecutor or others who have studied Watergate
closely. Congressional attempts to reduce the corrupting role of
money in politics by legislating campaign-financing reform have
been wrapped up in the members' narrow self-interest as much as
the interest of our public weal.... [W]e are far better at exposing
the errors of the past than at working meaningful changes in the
system to insure that the same wrongs do not recur.
5
4. STONEWALL, supra note 1, at 394.
5. Id at 393-94.
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 51
